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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the 
                                              
*
 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District 
Judge for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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people to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  This case is about a seizure and presents questions 
of whether and how the Constitution‘s guarantee applies in 
the case of a material witness who was jailed for weeks on 
end, even though the date of the trial in which she was to 
testify had been pushed back several months.  We hold that 
the Fourth Amendment applies to such a detention, and that it 
requires a prosecutor responsible for such a detention to 
inform the judge who ordered the witness‘s incarceration of 
any substantial change in the underlying circumstances.  We 
also conclude that the prosecutor in this case had ―fair 
warning‖ of the constitutional right she is accused of 
violating, and that she is therefore not shielded from liability 
by the doctrine of qualified immunity.  Finally, we reaffirm 
our earlier holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity does 
not apply.  We will therefore affirm the District Court‘s order 
denying summary judgment to the defendant.   
I 
 Nicole Schneyder was an essential witness in 
Pennsylvania‘s effort to bring Michael Overby to justice for 
rape, robbery, and murder.  After apparently being threatened 
by Overby‘s family, Schneyder refused to testify, going so far 
as to pull a knife on a police detective as he attempted to 
arrest her for the purpose of compelling her appearance in 
court.  Schneyder successfully avoided capture for the 
duration of Overby‘s first two trials, so the prosecution 
offered her prior recorded statements in lieu of her live 
testimony.  This procedure presented obvious Confrontation 
Clause problems, and Overby‘s conviction in the second trial 
4 
 
(the first ended in a hung jury) was overturned on appeal.  
Commonwealth v. Overby, 809 A.2d 295 (Pa. 2002).
1
 
 Overby‘s third trial—at which Schneyder‘s live 
testimony would be absolutely necessary—was set to begin 
on February 2, 2005.  Schneyder went into hiding as the trial 
date approached, leaving the police unable to serve her with a 
subpoena despite several attempts.  Schneyder‘s mother 
informed police on one of these occasions that her daughter 
had no intention of coming into court.   
 On January 26, 2005, Philadelphia assistant district 
attorney Gina Smith applied to Judge Rayford Means of the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas for a warrant 
authorizing Schneyder‘s arrest as a material witness pursuant 
to what is now Pa. R. Crim. P. 522.
2
  Rule 522(A) allows a 
court to ―issue process‖ and ―set bail for any material 
witness‖ for whom there is ―adequate cause for the court to 
conclude that the witness will fail to appear when required if 
not held in custody or released on bail.‖  Once process has 
issued and the witness has been brought into court, Rule 
522(B) directs that ―the court shall commit the witness to jail‖ 
if she is unable to fulfill the bail conditions—provided that 
the court must release the witness if at any time thereafter she 
                                              
1
 On the fourth try, the Commonwealth succeeded in 
convicting Overby of murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy.  
Schneyder apparently testified at that proceeding. 
2
 Rule 522 was formerly codified as Rule 4017.  The text of 
the Rule has not changed, although a new Comment was added in 
2006 (after the events giving rise to this appeal) directing that 
―[w]hen a material witness is to be detained, the court should 
impose the least restrictive means of assuring that witness‘s 
presence.‖ 
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satisfies the court‘s demands.  Smith‘s warrant application 
averred that Schneyder‘s testimony was ―critical,‖ that she 
―ha[d] been threatened by someone in the defendant‘s 
family,‖ and that ―[g]iven her previous several failure[s] to 
appear . . . it is highly unlikely that she will appear for trial.‖  
Judge Means issued the warrant, and a police officer 
apprehended Schneyder that night.   
Judge Means scheduled a bail hearing for the next day 
and appointed public defender Laura Davis
3
 to represent 
Schneyder.  Before the hearing, Judge Means met with Smith 
and Davis in camera.  At this off-the-record meeting, Judge 
Means advised Smith that he intended to authorize 
Schneyder‘s detention until trial, but instructed Smith to 
inform him in the event that the trial was pushed back from 
the scheduled date.
4
  On the record, Judge Means expressed 
distaste for ―setting bail on people who are not accused of a 
crime,‖ but nevertheless ordered Schneyder imprisoned when 
she could not put up a $300,000 surety. The court also 
advised the parties (the language in the transcript leaves 
unclear precisely whom he was addressing): ―If the case 
breaks down, let me know early and I‘ll let you out.‖  Judge 
Means then went on: 
I only intend to keep you on this bail until you 
testify or the trial is concluded if you did have it 
on February 2nd and the Commonwealth says, 
we don‘t need you anymore, we‘re done with 
you, okay, then I will want them to come back 
                                              
3
 Davis is named as a third-party defendant in this suit, but 
she is not a party to this appeal. 
4
 Smith concedes this fact for purposes of the instant 
motion but would contest it at trial. 
6 
 
to me and say, look, we don‘t have any need for 
her.  If they make a decision at some point on 
January 31st, we changed our mind, we don‘t 
even need this lady, come back to me so I can 
bring her down and remove this. 
The court ordered an informal status conference for February 
14, 2005 to facilitate reassessment of the situation in the event 
that the trial remained ongoing.  According to Judge Means‘ 
affidavit, he ―explicitly placed the onus on Ms. Smith to 
notify me if for any reason the case was continued or broke 
down, as it was my clear intention that, in that event, I would 
immediately release Ms. Schneyder from custody.‖  Further, 
he averred that, ―[h]ad I been notified that the Overby case 
had been continued, I would have immediately ordered Ms. 
Schneyder‘s release.‖ 
When February 2 arrived, the Overby trial (over which 
Judge Means was not presiding) was continued until May 25, 
2005.  Smith did not inform Judge Means of this fact,
5
 and 
Schneyder remained in jail.  Smith did not appear for the 
scheduled February 14 status conference, which led Judge 
Means to assume that the issue of Schneyder‘s detention had 
been mooted by her release.  Over the course of the next 
several weeks, members of Schneyder‘s family contacted 
Smith ―approximately 25 times‖ to inquire as to why she was 
still in jail and to ask when she would be let go.  Schneyder‘s 
father died on February 28, and on March 1 Schneyder‘s 
                                              
5
 Smith concedes this point only for purposes of the motion 
that has given rise to this appeal; she testified in her deposition that 
she had appeared in Judge Means‘s courtroom more than once 
between February 2 and February 14, and that she had informed 
the judge and his staff of the continuance.  
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sister contacted Paul Conway, chief of the Philadelphia 
Defender Association‘s Homicide Unit,6 in the hopes that he 
could obtain Schneyder‘s release for the funeral.  Conway 
was able to secure only an order allowing the plaintiff to visit 
the funeral home in handcuffs for a few minutes; Schneyder 
was denied permission to attend the funeral itself. 
In the process of obtaining the funeral home release, 
Conway learned that the trial for which Schneyder was being 
held was not set to start until late May.  In Conway‘s view, ―it 
wasn‘t right to keep her there‖ for such a long time, so he 
began an effort to free Schneyder from jail.  He started by 
contacting Smith, but she initially refused to agree to 
Schneyder‘s release.  His next step was to ask that Schneyder 
be allowed out on house arrest.  In the course of preparing 
that request, Conway made contact with Davis, the public 
defender who had been assigned to Schneyder at the January 
27 bail hearing.  Davis provided him with her notes of that 
hearing, and upon reading them Conway became convinced 
that Judge Means had meant for Schneyder to be released in 
the event that the Overby trial did not start on February 2.  
Put in that context, the fact that Schneyder was still locked up 
made Conway ―really angry.‖  He hustled to Judge Means‘ 
courtroom and (according to Conway‘s account) ―astonished‖ 
the judge by telling him that Schneyder was still in custody.  
Judge Means ordered Schneyder discharged shortly 
thereafter.  By this time it was March 21, and Schneyder had 
                                              
6
 Prior opinions in this case have indicated that Conway 
was a hired attorney when he was in fact a public defender 
approached for assistance by Schneyder‘s family.  See Odd v. 
Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2008); Schneyder v. Smith, 709 
F. Supp. 2d 368, 373 (E.D. Pa. 2010).   
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been locked up for 54 days—48 of them after the February 2 
continuance. 
 Schneyder sued Smith and the Philadelphia District 
Attorney‘s office, filing a complaint which included claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.  Only the § 1983 claim 
against Smith remains in the case; it alleges that Smith 
violated Schneyder‘s Fourth Amendment rights ―by failing to 
notify Judge Means or take any steps to have plaintiff 
released from custody knowing that she would not be needed 
as a witness in the underlying criminal case for several more 
months.‖ The District Court initially granted Smith‘s Rule 12 
motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim on the basis that she was 
entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, but a panel of this 
court reversed.  Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008).
7
  
After remand and discovery, Smith invoked both absolute and 
qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment.  The 
District Court rejected Smith‘s arguments and denied the 
motion.  Schneyder v. Smith, 709 F. Supp. 2d 368 (E.D. Pa. 
2010).  This appeal ensued. 
II 
We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral 
order doctrine: ―28 U.S.C. § 1291 confers appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court‘s denial, at the summary-
judgment stage, of [a] defendant[‘s] claim that [she is] 
entitled to absolute or qualified immunity, to the extent that 
denial turns on questions of law.‖  Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. 
Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations omitted).  There are no material factual disputes, 
                                              
7
 Schneyder‘s appeal was consolidated with the case of one 
Korvell Odd; the caption on our prior opinion bears his name.  
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Smith having conceded various of the plaintiff‘s factual 
averments for purposes of this motion. 
 We review the District Court‘s denial of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same test that the District 
Court should have applied and viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Id.  
III 
―The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 
government officials ‗from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.‘‖ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 
808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982)).  There are two related but distinct inquiries in a 
qualified immunity case.  One is whether the defendant‘s 
conduct violated the plaintiff‘s civil rights; the other is 
whether the right in question was clearly established at the 
time of the violation.  We conclude that both of these 
questions should be answered affirmatively, and that Smith is 
therefore not shielded by qualified immunity.   
A 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
provides that ―[e]very person who, under color of [state law], 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured‖ in an appropriate action.  Setting aside the 
availability of immunity, the basic cause of action requires 
10 
 
that a § 1983 plaintiff prove two essential elements: (1) that 
the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting 
under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the 
plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.  Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).  There is no question that 
Smith, who acted in her capacity as an assistant district 
attorney, did so under color of state law.  The question under 
§ 1983 is therefore whether Smith‘s failure to advise Judge 
Means of the continuance in Overby deprived Schneyder of a 
constitutionally protected right.  This inquiry can be 
subdivided into the questions (1) whether Schneyder‘s 
imprisonment violated one or more of her constitutional 
rights, and, if so, (2) whether Smith‘s conduct caused the 
illegal imprisonment. 
1 
To determine whether Schneyder has made out a 
violation of her constitutional rights, we first must determine 
what right she is asserting and whence in the Constitution that 
right springs.  The parties and the District Court have all 
discussed the right at issue primarily in terms of the Fourth 
Amendment‘s proscription of unreasonable seizures.  
Superficially, at least, Schneyder‘s imprisonment meets the 
Supreme Court‘s definition of a ―seizure‖: ―a Fourth 
Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a 
governmental termination of freedom of movement through 
means intentionally applied.‖ Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 
381 (2007) (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
596–97 (1989)).  Schneyder‘s freedom of movement was 
obviously terminated, and there is ample evidence that Smith 
intended that result.  See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (al-Kidd II), 563 
11 
 
U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2010) (―An arrest, of course, 
qualifies as a ‗seizure‘ of a ‗person‘ . . . , and so must be 
reasonable under the circumstances.‖) (citation omitted). 
There was, however, some suggestion at oral argument, and 
in the briefs, that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process 
Clause applies instead.
8
 
 The question of which Amendment applies is 
answered, at least in this Circuit, by citation to Gallo v. City 
of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222–24 (3d Cir. 1998), 
wherein we adopted Justice Ginsburg‘s ―continuing seizure‖ 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  See Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 277–80 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  In her Albright concurrence, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote: 
At common law, an arrested person‘s seizure 
was deemed to continue even after release from 
official custody.  See, e.g., 2 M. Hale, Pleas of 
the Crown *124 (―he that is bailed, is in 
supposition of law still in custody, and the 
parties that take him to bail are in law his 
keepers‖); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 
                                              
8
 In order to argue that the Fourth Amendment is not 
applicable—or at least that its applicability was not clearly 
established—Smith‘s briefs distinguish ―seizures‖ from 
―detentions,‖ arguing that at some point after the arrest 
Schneyder‘s incarceration became a ―detention‖ not subject to the 
Fourth Amendment.  The unspoken corollary must be that 
―detentions‖ are governed directly by the Due Process Clause; 
otherwise Smith‘s proposed distinction would leave a ―detained‖ 
material witness without any constitutionally protected liberty 
interest whatsoever. 
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*297 (bail in both civil and criminal cases is ―a 
delivery or bailment, of a person to his sureties, 
. . . he being supposed to continue in their 
friendly custody, instead of going to gaol‖).  
Id. at 277–78.  The purpose of the arrest, regardless of the 
nature of the case, ―was ‗only to compel an appearance in 
court,‘ and ‗that purpose is equally answered, whether the 
sheriff detains [the suspect‘s] person, or takes sufficient 
security for his appearance, called bail.‘‖ Id. at 278 (citing 3 
Blackstone, supra, at *290 (discussing civil cases); 4 id., at 
*297 (explaining that the nature of bail is the same in criminal 
and civil cases)).  Pre-trial restrictions of liberty aimed at 
securing a suspect‘s court attendance are all ―seizures‖ on this 
view; the difference between detention in jail, release on 
bond, and release subject to compliance with other conditions 
is in the degree of restriction on the individual‘s liberty, not 
in the kind of restriction.  Id.  Justice Ginsburg went on to 
argue that ―[t]his view of the definition and duration of a 
seizure comports with common sense and common 
understanding.‖  Id.  A person who is ―required to appear in 
court at the state‘s command,‖ who may be (for instance) 
―subject . . . to the condition that he seek formal permission 
from the court . . . before exercising what would otherwise be 
his unquestioned right to travel outside the jurisdiction,‖ and 
who may suffer diminished employment prospects, 
reputational harm, and ―the financial and emotional strain of 
preparing a defense‖ continues to labor under a restriction of 
his liberty interests even though he is not in custody.  Id.  
Thus even a defendant who is released pending trial ―is 
scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his 
movements, indeed ‗seized‘ for trial, so long as he is bound to 
appear in court and answer the state‘s charges. He is equally 
13 
 
bound to appear, and is hence ‗seized‘ for trial, when the state 
employs the less strong-arm means of a summons in lieu of 
arrest to secure his presence in court.‖  Id. at 279.  On Justice 
Ginsburg‘s theory, the plaintiff in Albright (also suing under 
§ 1983 for a Fourth Amendment violation), ―remained 
effectively ‗seized‘ for trial for so long as the prosecution 
against him remained pending.‖  Id.  The rationale is that a 
government-imposed restriction on a person‘s liberty is a 
seizure governed by the Fourth Amendment if its purpose is 
to ensure that he appears in court.  In contrast, if a pre-trial 
detainee suffers a deprivation amounting to punishment, his 
claim is governed by the Due Process Clause:  ―[A] detainee 
may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in 
accordance with due process of law.‖ Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 535 (1979).  And once a person has been convicted 
and sentenced, his liberty may be restricted provided that he 
received the process he was due and that the conditions and 
duration of his punishment are not ―cruel‖ or ―unusual‖ under 
the Eighth Amendment.
9
  But when the government restricts 
the liberty of a person who has not been convicted of a crime 
for the purpose of securing her court appearance, that 
restriction is a Fourth Amendment seizure.  
                                              
9
 Similar reasoning explains why the detention of a person 
who has been involuntarily committed, as well as the conditions of 
his confinement, are governed by the Due Process Clause.  See 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982).  While the 
initial arrest of such a person to compel his appearance at the 
commitment proceeding might be governed by the Fourth 
Amendment, once commitment has been ordered he is no longer 
being detained for the purpose of ensuring that he will appear in 
court.  Thus he is no longer ―seized‖ for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, and the requirements of due process take over. 
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 We followed this analysis in Gallo, stating that it was 
both ―compelling and supported by Supreme Court case law.‖  
161 F.3d at 223.  Applying Justice Ginsburg‘s reasoning, we 
held that the plaintiff had been seized where he ―had to post a 
$10,000 bond, . . . had to attend all court hearings including 
his trial and arraignment, . . . was required to contact Pre-trial 
Services on a weekly basis, and . . . was prohibited from 
traveling outside New Jersey and Pennsylvania.‖  Id.  
Similarly, in Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85 n.14 (3d Cir. 
2007), we held that the plaintiff‘s detention in a cell for two 
days, the requirement that he post bail, and the fact that he 
was required to appear in court for a hearing constituted a 
Fourth Amendment seizure.  See also DiBella v. Borough of 
Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005) (―Pre-trial 
custody and some onerous types of pre-trial, non-custodial 
restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.‖).  The 
theory undergirding these decisions and Justice Ginsburg‘s 
Albright concurrence is that substantial pre-trial restrictions 
on liberty—most prominently, custodial detentions—are 
―seizures‖ when they are imposed in order to compel a court 
appearance.   
We acknowledge that this theory may be in tension 
with our statement in Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 
174 (3d Cir. 1998), that ―the limits of Fourth Amendment 
protection relate to the boundary between arrest and pre-trial 
detention‖—the implication being that once the state‘s 
conduct ceases to be an arrest and begins to constitute pre-
trial detention (wherever that line may be drawn), the seizure 
ends and the Fourth Amendment no longer applies.
10
  The 
                                              
10
 We also acknowledge that other circuits have declined to 
adopt Justice Ginsburg‘s theory.  See, e.g., Harrington v. City of 
Nashua, 610 F.3d 24, 33 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010); Reed v. City of 
15 
 
Torres court‘s statement is not, however, binding on us here.  
For one thing, Torres was decided after Gallo, leaving its 
precedential value on this point in serious doubt.
11
  See 
Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 278 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2001) (―[T]o the extent that [a case within this Circuit] is read 
to be inconsistent with earlier case law, the earlier case law . . 
. controls.‖) (citation omitted).  Moreover, the above 
quotation from Torres is dicta: the case involved the question 
whether Torres‘ post-conviction incarceration was a Fourth 
Amendment seizure.  The answer to that question is ―no,‖ 
even under the Ginsburg-Gallo theory.  The Torres panel 
therefore had no need to opine on the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment‘s pre-conviction application.  Finally, Torres left 
open the possibility that ―there may be some circumstances 
during pre-trial custodial detention that implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights,‖ 169 F.3d at 174, and if that is the case 
then surely the very fact of a pre-trial detention would 
implicate the right against unreasonable seizures.   
We agree with Gallo‘s assessment of Justice 
Ginsburg‘s theory, and therefore reaffirm what Gallo at least 
strongly implied:  When the state places constitutionally 
significant
12
 restrictions on a person‘s freedom of movement 
                                                                                                     
Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1052 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996).  As we have 
explained, Gallo would require us to adhere to the continuing 
seizure theory even if we were otherwise disposed to reject it. 
11
 The majority opinion in Torres does not cite Gallo—
though the dissent does.  See 163 F.3d at 179 (Debevoise, Dist. J., 
dissenting). 
12
 We hold open the possibility that some conditions on 
pre-trial release may be so insignificant as not to implicate 
constitutionally protected liberty interests.  See, e.g., Kingsland v. 
City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding 
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for the purpose of obtaining his presence at a judicial 
proceeding, that person has been seized within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.   
 This theory concerning the ―definition and duration of 
a seizure,‖ Albright, 510 U.S. at 278 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring), implies that when a material witness is subjected 
to constitutionally significant restrictions of her liberty for the 
purpose of securing her appearance at trial, those restrictions 
are governed by the Fourth Amendment.  That Amendment is 
not limited to criminal suspects, but protects ―[t]he right of 
the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.‖  U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court defines ―seizure‖ in general 
terms: ―a person has been ‗seized‘ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave.‖  California v. Hodari 
D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (quoting United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)) (emphasis added).  
The Fourth Amendment‘s protection against unreasonable 
seizures extends to all of ―the people,‖ and the guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights extend to a person detained as a material 
witness just as they would extend to anyone else.  See al-Kidd 
II, 131 S. Ct. at 2080–83 (applying Fourth Amendment 
analysis to the arrest and detention of a material witness); al-
Kidd v. Ashcroft (al-Kidd I), 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 
2009) (―[M]aterial witness arrests are ‗seizures‘ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and are therefore subject 
to its reasonableness requirement.‖) (citing Bacon v. United 
States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 1971)), rev’d on other 
                                                                                                     
that conditions of release not amounting to a ―significant 
deprivation of liberty‖ did not implicate the Fourth Amendment).   
17 
 
grounds, 563 U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2074.  A person who is 
subjected to conditions that would constitute a seizure if she 
had been arrested for a crime is still seized even though she is 
not a criminal suspect but a material witness.  She has been 
arrested and deprived of liberty for precisely the same 
purpose as a pre-trial detainee in a criminal case: to ensure 
that she shows up in court as required by the state.  See 
Albright, 510 U.S. at 278–79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  The 
Fourth Amendment therefore governs our inquiry into the 
constitutionality of Schneyder‘s detention. 
2 
As we noted above, Schneyder‘s incarceration plainly 
meets the Supreme Court‘s definition of a Fourth Amendment 
―seizure.‖  But that is not the end of the story, for ―what the 
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but 
unreasonable searches and seizures.‖  Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (emphasis added); United States v. 
Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005).  In the ordinary 
criminal case, arrest and detention of a suspect is reasonable 
if it is supported by probable cause, as determined by the 
judge who either issues an arrest warrant or conducts a 
preliminary hearing.  See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 111–14 (1975).  Gerstein explained that the probable 
cause standard ―represents a necessary accommodation 
between the individual‘s right to liberty and the State‘s duty 
to control crime‖—that is, it is a particular instance of the 
Fourth Amendment‘s more general inquiry into overall 
reasonableness.  Id. at 112.  This point is further reflected in 
the fact that while a pre-arrest probable cause determination is 
to be made by a ―neutral and detached magistrate whenever 
possible,‖ the Fourth Amendment admits of ―practical 
compromise‖ allowing police to make an on-the-scene 
18 
 
probable cause assessment so long as any prolonged restraint 
of liberty is supported by a prompt post-arrest judicial 
determination that probable cause does in fact exist.  Id. at 
112–14.   
We are not, however, presented with an ordinary 
criminal case, and despite the parties‘ arguments and the 
District Court‘s opinion (all of which are couched in terms of 
probable cause), probable cause is an inapposite concept for 
assessing whether the detention of a material witness was 
constitutionally reasonable.  The phrase ―probable cause‖ 
appears, on its face, to prescribe only a burden of proof, and 
the Fourth Amendment does not provide an obvious answer 
to the substantive question, ―probable cause as to what?‖  
This is explained by the fact that ―probable cause, since 
before the founding, has always been a term of art of criminal 
procedure.‖  al-Kidd I, 580 F.3d at 966.  The phrase has 
meaning, derived from its common-law origins, that is more 
than its two words would reveal if read in isolation.  That is, 
the term itself supplies an answer to the ―as to what?‖ 
question.  Probable cause demands that the police have 
reasonably trustworthy knowledge of facts ―sufficient to 
warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had 
committed or was committing an offense.‖  Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (emphasis added) (quoted in Gerstein, 420 
U.S. at 111; al-Kidd I, 580 F.3d at 966).  Stated differently, 
―[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a 
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.‖  Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (emphasis added) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoted in Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).
13
   See also al-Kidd I, 580 
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 Smith‘s opening brief, at 39, quotes the Brinegar 
formulation (citing Pringle) but conspicuously elides the phrase 
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F.3d at 966–67 (citing, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 811 (1996); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 
(1979); Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 
(1813) (Marshall, C.J.)). ―Probable cause as used in the 
Fourth Amendment is a substantive concept of law. . . .  Its 
meaning embraces not merely a certain quantum of evidence, 
but a certain quantum of evidence related to one and only one 
specific thing—the commission of a crime.  This has always 
been so.‖  Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of 
―Hold Until Cleared‖: Reexamining Material Witness 
Detentions in the Wake of the September 11 Dragnet, 58 
Vand. L. Rev. 677, 716–19 (2005).  For probable cause to 
exist, the evidence available must provide police or the 
warrant-issuing magistrate with reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime.  This 
definition of the term renders it irrelevant to an assessment of 
the legality of the seizure of a material witness:  ―An arrest of 
a material witness is not justified by probable cause because 
[the facts that justify such an arrest] do not constitute the 
elements of a crime.‖  al-Kidd I, 580 F.3d at 967; see also al-
Kidd II, 131 S. Ct. at 2082,  2083 (discussing the justification 
for detaining a person as a material witness in terms of 
―individualized reasons to believe that he was a material 
witness and that he would soon disappear‖ and 
―individualized suspicion,‖ rather than probable cause).14 
                                                                                                     
―of guilt‖—apparently to avoid grappling with the fact that 
Schneyder was not arrested or detained because anyone thought 
her guilty of a crime. 
14
 The cases cited for the proposition that probable cause is 
the appropriate lens through which to view this case do not engage 
in any analysis of the issue, and we can set them aside.  See Stone 
v. Holzberger, 1994 WL 175420, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 231 (6th 
Cir.) (unpublished) (requiring that a detained material witness be 
20 
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afforded a probable cause hearing without discussing what should 
be assessed at such a hearing); White v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457, 
460–61 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a material witness‘s arrest 
―was supported by probable cause‖ without considering the term‘s 
applicability); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 
1979) (stating uncritically that a material witness‘s ―arrest and 
detention must be based on probable cause‖).  See also Donald Q. 
Cochran, Material Witness Detention in a Post-9/11 World: 
Mission Creep or Fresh Start?, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 18 & 
n.105 (2010) (noting that ―[c]ourts have generally relied on the 
Bacon ‗probable cause‘ standard without any discussion of its 
reasoning‖).   
Bacon actually read the federal material witness statute to 
require ―probable cause to believe (1) that the testimony of a 
person is material and (2) that it may become impracticable to 
secure his presence by subpoena.‖  449 F.2d at 943 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The Ninth Circuit‘s opinion 
thus arguably redefined a preexisting constitutional term of art, and 
to the extent it does so its persuasiveness (along with the 
persuasiveness of those cases relying on it) is badly undercut.  See 
Bascuas, supra, 58 Vand. L. Rev. at 715–19 (criticizing Bacon and 
―the idea that ‗probable cause‘ can be redefined from case to 
case‖).  But see Cochran, supra, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 20–21 
(noting that ―probable cause is a two-prong concept, possessing 
both a burden-of-proof component and a substantive component,‖ 
and arguing that in material witness cases the substantive 
component is not guilt of a crime but ―the risk that a miscarriage of 
justice will occur‖ absent the witness‘s testimony).  The Ninth 
Circuit panel that decided al-Kidd I interpreted Bacon as having 
only imported the burden-of-proof element of probable cause, 
which it then applied to the federal material witness statute‘s 
substantive requirements.  580 F.3d at 967–68. 
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So while the Fourth Amendment applies here, the 
probable cause requirement cannot.  The Amendment 
provides only one standard that could govern this situation: a 
seizure of an uncharged material witness is constitutionally 
prohibited if it is ―unreasonable.‖15  Schneyder‘s Fourth 
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 It can be argued that because (i) the Fourth Amendment 
requires that warrants be supported by probable cause, and (ii) 
―probable cause,‖ as defined above, cannot exist for a person 
seized only as a material witness, the entire practice of issuing 
warrants for and arresting material witnesses is unconstitutional.  
See al-Kidd II, 131 S. Ct. at 2084–85 (suggesting the possibility of 
such an argument but noting that plaintiff in that case had not taken 
that position); id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing 
that ―[t]he scope of the [material witness] statute‘s lawful 
authorization is uncertain‖ because of a possible conflict with the 
Warrants Clause, but indicating that ―material witness arrests 
might still be governed by the Fourth Amendment‘s separate 
reasonableness requirement for seizures of the person‖); Bascuas, 
supra, 58 Vand. L. Rev. at 702–19 (Under ―the one and only 
definition of ‗probable cause,‘ the practice of detaining witnesses 
[can] not . . . survive[] constitutional analysis. Of course, the 
seizure of one innocent of any wrongdoing can never be supported 
by ‗probable cause‘ because ‗probable cause‘ for an arrest exists 
only where there is reason to believe that the prospective arrestee 
committed a crime.‖).  Like the plaintiff in al-Kidd, Schneyder 
does not argue that all material witness arrests are necessarily 
unconstitutional; we therefore do not address that question.  We 
assume, with the plaintiff, that her initial arrest was legal and that 
her detention became unlawful, if at all, once the Overby trial had 
been continued.  For reasons explained above, the only way to 
analyze such a claim under the Fourth Amendment is to inquire 
into the reasonableness of the detention.  We therefore assume for 
present purposes that the reasonableness framework applies, while 
leaving for another case the possibility that all arrests made 
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Amendment rights were therefore violated only to the extent 
that her detention as a material witness was ―unreasonable‖ 
within the Fourth Amendment‘s meaning, and Smith is liable 
under § 1983 only insofar as she caused Schneyder to endure 
such an ―unreasonable‖ detention.  See al-Kidd I, 580 F.3d at 
968 (interpreting Bacon as having held that a material witness 
seizure is ―reasonable‖ where the statutory requirements are 
established by a ―probable cause‖ burden of proof). 
The ―key principle of the Fourth Amendment‖ is the 
balancing of various competing interests.  Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (citation omitted).  
―To determine the constitutionality of a seizure ‗[we] must 
balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual‘s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.‘‖ Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) 
(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).  
The question is ―whether the totality of the circumstances 
justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.‖  Id. at 8–9.  
See also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 58–64 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (applying a balancing analysis to determine 
whether the length of a material-witness detention comported 
with the Fourth Amendment); Donald Q. Cochran, Material 
Witness Detention in a Post-9/11 World: Mission Creep or 
Fresh Start?, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 22–24 (2010) 
(proposing a rule combining ―probable cause‖ to believe that 
the elements of the federal material witness statute are met 
with a separate reasonable-duration limitation on the length of 
a detention); cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) 
(reading an implicit ―reasonable time‖ limitation into a 
                                                                                                     
without probable cause as to guilt of a crime, including material 
witness arrests, are ipso facto unconstitutional.  
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federal alien detention statute in order to avoid the ―serious 
constitutional problem[s]‖ that would face an indefinite 
detention provision).   
In Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992), 
Judge Posner offered a method of analysis for considering the 
reasonableness of a civil commitment:  ―In mathematical 
terms, the test of a reasonable commitment can be expressed 
by the inequality C<PH, where C is the cost of confinement 
to the person confined, H is the harm he might do if released, 
and P is the probability of his doing that harm if released.‖  
Id. at 796.  The premise of this formula is that detention is 
reasonable where the expected cost to the public of releasing 
the detainee exceeds the expected cost to the individual of 
being imprisoned.  So as the cost to the plaintiff of being 
confined increases (e.g., as the incarceration grows longer), 
so too must the magnitude of the harm to be prevented, or the 
likelihood of that harm (or both), if PH is to keep pace with C 
and thus continue to justify confinement.  This analysis 
resembles Learned Hand‘s famous negligence test, see United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947), for good reason: ―The test of negligence at common 
law and of an unlawful search or seizure challenged under the 
Fourth Amendment is the same: unreasonableness in the 
circumstances.‖  Villanova, 972 F.2d at 796; see also 
Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 59 (balancing a material witness‘s 
liberty interests against the government‘s interest in a 
successful terrorism prosecution).  However helpful Judge 
Posner‘s approach may be, of course, courts must in the end 
bear in mind that ―the application of standards that can be 
expressed in algebraic terms still requires the exercise of 
judgment, implying elements of inescapable subjectivity and 
intuition in the decisional calculus.‖  Villanova, 972 F.2d at 
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796 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6 
(7th Cir. 1992)).   
Here, the alleged problem with Schneyder‘s detention 
is that it went on for an unreasonable length of time—i.e., 
longer than the facts of the case warranted.  On the ―cost to 
the plaintiff‖ side of the ledger we have Schneyder‘s obvious 
and quite substantial interest, as a citizen not accused of any 
crime, in being free from incarceration.  On the other side, we 
have the significant harm that might have been done to the 
Commonwealth‘s case against Overby, and thus to the overall 
justice system, by the failure of a critical witness to testify.  
At the time Schneyder was arrested, the likelihood of that 
harm was high, as she clearly did not intend to appear in 
court.  Given the relatively brief period of time that she would 
have had to spend in jail (a maximum of some 19 days, had 
Schneyder been released on the date of Judge Means‘ 
scheduled informal status hearing) in order to remain 
available for a February 2 trial, we may suppose that her 
initial arrest and detention were reasonable: the potential cost 
to Schneyder was not terribly high in comparison with the 
risk that the prosecution would fall apart in her absence.
16
 
This balance, Schneyder argues (or should have 
argued, had she framed her complaint in terms of 
reasonableness rather than probable cause), was upset when 
the trial was pushed back more than three months.  While the 
potential harm to the prosecution‘s case remained the same, 
                                              
16
 Schneyder‘s counsel conceded at oral argument that 
―there was probable cause to detain [Schneyder] initially‖; we 
assume that he would likewise concede that the arrest and 
detention until February 2 were ―reasonable‖ under the framework 
that we have set out. 
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the weight of Schneyder‘s liberty interest grew considerably: 
instead of the twelve days that were left before the scheduled 
status hearing on the date of the continuance, she was 
suddenly looking at some 131 days in jail before the trial 
would even start.
17
  Even if the risk to the public interest 
remained high, a jury could find that the cost to Schneyder of 
being imprisoned outweighed the state‘s interest in holding 
her for that extra time.  Moreover, a jury could conclude that 
the risk of harm (that is, P) was not as great as the 
government would have it.   Schneyder seems not to have 
been especially difficult to apprehend (an officer picked her 
up on the same night that the warrant issued), and there is 
evidence that being arrested had impressed on her the gravity 
of the situation and had thus made it more likely that she 
would show up for court.  A reasonable jury could find that 
Schneyder‘s prolonged detention became unreasonable once 
the case had been continued.
18
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 In point of fact, Schneyder‘s wait could well have been 
much longer: Overby‘s third trial ended in a hung jury on 
November 1, 2006, and he was not finally convicted until February 
20, 2007—more than two years after Schneyder‘s initial arrest. 
18
 It is a mistake to argue that Smith‘s failure to comply 
with Judge Means‘ order was the essence of the alleged Fourth 
Amendment violation.  A state judge‘s order cannot have created a 
federal constitutional right where none otherwise existed.  The 
Fourth Amendment‘s reasonableness standard is an objective one, 
see Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
388 (1989)), that relies on a balancing of competing interests, as 
discussed above.  Judge Means‘ words cannot have had any 
bearing on the relative weights of those interests, although it may 
have altered Schneyder‘s subjective (and therefore irrelevant) 
expectations.  See al-Kidd II, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (―Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness is predominantly an objective inquiry. 
. . .  This approach recognizes that the Fourth Amendment 
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4 
Schneyder has thus made out a prima facie case that 
she suffered a Fourth Amendment violation.  Section 1983 
also requires her to show that Smith was a legal cause of her 
unreasonable detention.  See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 
277, 284–85 (1980); Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 
                                                                                                     
regulates conduct rather than thoughts; and it promotes 
evenhanded, uniform enforcement of the law.‖) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (―[T]he 
Fourth Amendment‘s concern with ‗reasonableness‘ allows certain 
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the 
subjective intent.‖). 
Nor can Judge Means‘ statements constitute a ruling that 
further detention in the event of a delay in trial would be 
unreasonable.  Such an ex ante assessment cannot take into 
account all of the circumstances surrounding a given incident: 
Judge Means cannot have known at the time of Schneyder‘s bail 
hearing how long the delay would be; nor could he have taken into 
account the possibility that the likelihood that Schneyder would 
appear if freed might change.  At most, Judge Means‘ assessment 
might have provided some rule-of-thumb guidance. It was not a 
binding determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
Finally, we note that while Judge Means‘ order may have 
placed an obligation upon Smith, that obligation was one that she 
owed to the court rather than to Schneyder.  The proper remedy for 
the violation of such an order is a disciplinary proceeding or a 
contempt charge, not a § 1983 suit by a third party.  That is, Smith 
owed two overlapping duties:  One to the court, which obligated 
her to obey the judge‘s order and which the court may enforce in 
the same manner as any other order; and another to Schneyder, 
which obligated Smith not to violate any constitutional rights and 
which Schneyder may seek to enforce through civil-rights 
litigation. 
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193 (3d Cir. 2004); Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 431, 
440–53, and finding no proximate causation in a § 1983 
excessive-force case).  In tort law a person‘s action is a legal 
cause of another‘s injury if ―his conduct is a substantial factor 
in bringing about the harm.‖  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
431.  ―Lurk[ing]‖ in this understanding of causation is ―the 
idea of responsibility‖; the real question is whether an 
ordinary person would regard the act in question as having 
caused the harm, ―in the popular sense.‖  Id. cmt. a.   
On the facts before us, we conclude that Schneyder has 
made her case.  The District Court summarized much of the 
relevant evidence in the course of making a slightly different 
point: 
[There was] deposition testimony: (1) that the 
duty to notify Judge Means of a trial 
continuance did not rest [on] the Sheriff‘s 
Office, the Philadelphia prison system, or the 
court administration; (2) from Public Defender 
Paul Conway that defendant ―was the only one 
that ha[d] the information that [Judge Means] 
needed for him to make the decision‖ on 
plaintiff's continued detention; (3) from court 
personnel working in the chambers of Judges 
Poserina
19
 and Means that defendant‘s failure to 
notify Judge Means would not comport with 
their understanding of usual court practice and 
procedure; and (4) that following the release of 
Korvel Odd on January 13, 2005—who was 
kept in custody for 37 days after the criminal 
                                              
19
 Judge John J. Poserina presided in Overby. 
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case for which he was detained as a material 
witness was dismissed—assistant district 
attorneys were briefed on safeguards to ensure 
that no material witnesses were detained 
improperly.  These safeguards included 
centralizing procedures that required assistant 
district attorneys to seek a supervisor‘s approval 
of a material witness petition before presenting 
it to the judge; to present the petition to the 
judge assigned to the underlying criminal case; 
and to monitor the status of witnesses through 
the computer system to ensure that they were 
released promptly.  Both Homicide Unit Chief 
Edward McCann and his assistant, Ann 
Ponterio, agreed that they ―indicated to the unit‖ 
in January 2005 ―that when a witness is in 
custody and a case is either over, or is 
continued, or is guilty, or anything that we must 
make sure that the witness is released from 
custody.‖  
709 F. Supp. 2d. at 381–82 (citations omitted).  In addition to 
this evidence, Judge Means‘ various statements, in chambers 
and on the record, are relevant in that they indicate that he 
was reliant on Smith to keep him apprised of Overby‘s status 
so that he could monitor the continued reasonableness of 
Schneyder‘s detention.  Perhaps most importantly, Smith was 
the only official who was in a position to do anything about 
Schneyder‘s incarceration.  She was responsible for the 
issuance of the warrant and Schneyder‘s subsequent arrest, 
and there does not appear to be anyone else she can point to 
as being obligated to take steps to aid the court in monitoring 
the continued reasonableness of the detention—including by 
29 
 
informing the court that the trial date had changed.  As Smith 
should have been well aware, it is the court‘s role—not a 
prosecutor‘s—to assess the legality of an incarceration, and to 
do so on a continuing basis and in light of changes in the 
underlying facts.  Smith also should have known that the 
court would be unable to fulfill this function without a good-
faith effort on her part to keep Judge Means abreast of 
developments in the Overby case.  Schneyder has presented 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
Smith‘s failure to advise the court of the continuance was a 
substantial factor in causing her Fourth Amendment injury.
20
 
Smith‘s duty as a state official not to cause the 
violation of anyone‘s constitutional rights demanded that she 
advise the court of any substantial change in the 
circumstances justifying Schneyder‘s seizure as a material 
witness.  Smith was not required to advocate for Schneyder‘s 
release; she was obligated to provide the court with the 
information it needed to properly perform its adjudicative 
function.  A jury could find that she breached this duty, and 
                                              
20
 We recognize the potential here for a superseding cause 
argument: Judge Means‘ independent will stood in between 
Smith‘s disclosure of the continuance and Schneyder‘s liberation, 
so Smith‘s omission cannot have been a proximate cause of 
Schneyder‘s injuries.  See, e.g., Troup v. Sarasota Cnty., 419 F.3d 
1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding no causation in a § 1983 case 
where ―the continuum between Defendant‘s action and the ultimate 
harm is occupied by the conduct of deliberative and autonomous 
decision-makers‖) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Proximate cause is, however, generally a question for the jury, see 
Rivas, 365 F.3d at 193, and there is ample evidence that Judge 
Means would have released Schneyder without hesitation had 
Smith lived up to her obligations. 
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thereby proximately caused a violation of Schneyder‘s Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
5 
 To summarize what we have said so far:  The liberty 
interests of a detained material witness are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, because this court adheres to Justice 
Ginsburg‘s ―continuing seizure‖ theory.  Schneyder‘s 
detention was a seizure, but because she was not arrested as a 
criminal suspect ―probable cause‖ is the wrong lens through 
which to examine the case.  Instead, to determine whether her 
rights were violated we must assess whether the seizure was 
―reasonable‖ within the Fourth Amendment‘s meaning.  This 
requires balancing Schneyder‘s interests against the 
government‘s, and a jury could conclude that Schneyder‘s 
interest in going free outweighed the government‘s interest in 
keeping her locked up until the new trial date.  If Schneyder‘s 
rights were violated, Smith was the only official in a position 
to prevent it—by keeping Judge Means informed of 
significant changes in the facts underlying the detention 
order.  Smith‘s duty not to cause a violation of Schneyder‘s 
constitutional rights required her to promptly report the 
continuance in the Overby case to Judge Means—though she 
would have been free to argue that continued detention was 
warranted even in light of the new facts.  Because Smith did 
not fulfill this obligation, Schneyder has made out a prima 
facie case for recovery of damages under § 1983. 
B 
 Because the foregoing discussion takes place in the 
context of qualified immunity, our inquiry is not complete.  
We still must decide whether the duty we have just identified 
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was clearly established at the time the violation occurred.  
Ordinarily a constitutional duty is not clearly established 
simply because of the existence of a broad imperative like the 
one against ―unreasonable . . . seizures.‖  ―[I]f the test of 
‗clearly established law‘ were to be applied at this level of 
generality, it would bear no relationship to the ‗objective 
legal reasonableness‘ that is the touchstone of Harlow.‖  
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  Thus the 
usual rule is that ―the right the official is alleged to have 
violated must have been ‗clearly established‘ in a more 
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense:  The contours 
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.‖  Id. at 640.   
Although Anderson appears to require a relatively high 
degree of specificity before a rule can be called ―clearly 
established,‖ the Court was at pains to emphasize that ―[t]his 
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-
existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.‖  Id. (citation 
omitted).  The Court further expounded this principle in a line 
of cases beginning with United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 
(1997).  The ultimate question, the Court explained, is 
whether the defendant had ―‗fair warning‘ that his conduct 
deprived his victim of a constitutional right.‖  Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002) (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270–
71).  The Court went on: 
[G]eneral statements of the law are not 
inherently incapable of giving fair and clear 
warning, and . . . a general constitutional rule 
already identified in the decisional law may 
32 
 
apply with obvious clarity to the specific 
conduct in question, even though ―the very 
action in question has [not] previously been 
held unlawful.‖ 
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271 (quoting Anderson, 533 U.S. at 640).  
Most recently, the Court has reiterated: 
To be established clearly . . . there is no need 
that ―the very action in question [have] 
previously been held unlawful.‖ . . . 
[O]utrageous conduct obviously will be 
unconstitutional, this being the reason, as Judge 
Posner has said, that ―[t]he easiest cases don‘t 
even arise.‖ But even as to action less than an 
outrage, ―officials can still be on notice that 
their conduct violates established law . . . in 
novel factual circumstances.‖  
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. ---, 129 S. 
Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603, 615 (1999); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 
846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990); Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).   
―To determine whether a new scenario is sufficiently 
analogous to previously established law to warn an official 
that his/her conduct is unconstitutional, we ‗inquir[e] into the 
general legal principles governing analogous factual 
situations . . . and . . . determin[e] whether the official should 
have related this established law to the instant situation.‘‖ 
Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Hicks v. Feeney, 770 F.2d 375, 380 (3d Cir. 1985)) 
(alterations in original).  In extraordinary cases, a broad 
principle of law can clearly establish the rules governing a 
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new set of circumstances if the wrongfulness of an official‘s 
action is so obvious that ―every objectively reasonable 
government official facing the circumstances would know 
that the official‘s conduct did violate federal law when the 
official acted.‖ Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th 
Cir. 2002).  A plaintiff ―can demonstrate that the right was 
clearly established by presenting a closely analogous case that 
establishes that the Defendants‘ conduct was unconstitutional 
or by presenting evidence that the Defendant‘s conduct was 
so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable 
officials would know without guidance from a court.‖ Estate 
of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 779–80 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 739–40).  ―There has never been a 
section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster 
children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case 
arose, the officials would be immune from damages liability 
because no previous case had found liability in those 
circumstances.‖  K.H., 914 F.2d at 851. 
Although we are aware of no decision predating 
Smith‘s actions that involved the sort of claim that Schneyder 
has raised here, we are nevertheless convinced that this is one 
of those exceedingly rare cases in which the existence of the 
plaintiff‘s constitutional right is so manifest that it is clearly 
established by broad rules and general principles.  That is, 
this ought to have been a member of that class of ―easiest 
cases‖ that, according to Judge Posner, ―don‘t even arise.‖  
Id.; Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.   One of the ―point[s] of the 
Fourth Amendment‖ is to require that decisions involving 
citizens‘ security from searches and seizures be made 
wherever practicable by a ―neutral and detached magistrate‖ 
rather than by a police officer or prosecutor possessed of a 
natural bias towards uncovering crime and obtaining 
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convictions.  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 
(1948).  Thus the Court has established that a criminal suspect 
is entitled to a prompt judicial determination that his arrest 
and detention is justified by probable cause. Cnty. of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Gerstein, 
420 U.S. at 124–25.  And numerous courts have reached the 
almost tautological conclusion that an individual in custody 
has a constitutional right to be released from confinement 
―after it was or should have been known that the detainee was 
entitled to release.‖  Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 
1563 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 
913, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2002); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 
F.3d 564, 573–76 (7th Cir. 1998); Gray v. Cuyahoga Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 150 F.3d 579, 582–83 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144–45 (1979) (assuming 
that ―mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the 
face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a 
certain amount of time deprive the accused of ‗liberty . . . 
without due process of law‘‖).  It should have required little 
thought about these cases, in light of background knowledge 
of the operation of the Bill of Rights within the justice 
system, to have given a reasonable prosecutor ―fair warning‖ 
that she had a duty to ensure that the incarceration of an 
innocent person was at all times approved by a judicial 
officer. 
Smith took it upon herself to decide that Schneyder 
ought to be incarcerated well past the point at which explicit 
judicial authorization had expired.  Whether to keep 
Schneyder in jail should have been the court‘s decision, and 
Smith knew it.  Judge Means had announced his intention to 
let Schneyder go if the trial date were moved, but Smith took 
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the position that ―she should be held until she testified.‖  
Actually, to say that she ―took the position‖ is too generous, 
because Smith never presented the court with any such 
argument.  She ―advocated‖ her position by failing to reveal 
an obviously pertinent fact, thereby preventing the judge from 
doing his job.  Moreover, the stance Smith purports to have 
taken is so patently erroneous as a matter of constitutional 
law as to be frivolous.  No reasonable prosecutor would think 
that she could indefinitely detain an innocent witness pending 
trial without obtaining reauthorization.  And there can be no 
doubt that is what Smith intended.  The trial at which 
Schneyder was to testify did not take place until more than a 
year and a half after her arrest, and there is no indication that 
Smith would ever have taken steps of her own volition to free 
her key witness or even to have her status reviewed.  If the 
initial continuance was not something Smith felt a need to 
report, there is no reason to think that she would have advised 
Judge Means of any of the subsequent developments.  Were it 
not for the persistence of Schneyder‘s family and the 
generous efforts of a public defender with cases of his own 
and no prior connection to the plaintiff, there can be no telling 
how long she would have remained locked up.
21
   
―When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects 
‗all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.‘‖  al-Kidd II, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (quoting 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  The self-
evident wrongfulness of Smith‘s conduct is sufficient to place 
                                              
21
 The judges comprising this panel—all three former 
prosecutors—feel secure in declaring that any reasonable attorney 
in Smith‘s position would have known that her course of action 
was so outrageous as to be unconstitutional, even in the absence of 
a case telling her so.   
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her in either category.  She is not entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
IV 
The final issue we must address is whether Smith, as a 
prosecutor, is entitled to absolute immunity from liability.  
The court has already answered this question in the negative, 
Odd, 538 F.3d at 214, so the ―law of the case‖ doctrine would 
ordinarily preclude this panel from reconsidering it.  Pub. 
Interest Research Grp. v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d 111, 
116 (3d Cir. 1997).  But because this is a rule of discretion 
rather than a limit on authority, it does not apply in 
―extraordinary circumstances.‖  Id.  These ―include situations 
in which: (1) new evidence is available; (2) a supervening 
new law has been announced; or (3) the earlier decision was 
clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice.‖  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Smith of course thinks that our earlier 
adverse ruling was wrongly decided; she bolsters this position 
by asserting that both newly developed facts and the Supreme 
Court‘s intervening decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 
555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009), have sufficiently altered 
the landscape that our earlier decision should be disregarded.  
Notwithstanding these changes in context, we remain of the 
view that granting prosecutorial immunity would be 
inappropriate in this case. 
A 
Before considering Smith‘s arguments, we briefly 
rehearse the rationale for denying absolute immunity that we 
set forth in Odd.  The basic premise behind the immunity 
doctrine is that prosecutors should not be encumbered by the 
threat of civil liability while performing judicial or quasi-
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judicial functions.  See Odd, 538 F.3d at 208.  But a person is 
not immune from suit for every wrong he commits just 
because he happens to be employed as a prosecutor: the 
―inquiry focuses on ‗the nature of the function performed, not 
the identity of the actor who performed it.‘‖  Id. (quoting 
Light v. Harris, 472 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Analysis of 
prosecutorial immunity questions thus has two basic steps, 
though they tend to overlap.  The court must ascertain just 
what conduct forms the basis for the plaintiff‘s cause of 
action, and it must then determine what function 
(prosecutorial, administrative, investigative, or something 
else entirely) that act served.  See id.   
The first stage ―focuses on the unique facts of each 
case and requires careful dissection of the prosecutor‘s 
actions.‖  Id. at 210 (citations omitted).  Thus in Odd we 
―carefully defin[ed] the act (or rather omission) that gave rise 
to Schneyder‘s suit‖ as a ―failure to notify Judge Means (per 
his order and per local custom) that the Overby case had been 
continued.‖  Id. at 212.  Elsewhere we described it as an 
omission to ―inform[] the court about the status of a detained 
witness.‖  Id. at 213.  From these definitions, ―it follow[ed] 
that Smith is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity,‖ 
because her obligation ―was primarily administrative, 
especially in light of Judge Means‘s explicit order that he be 
advised of any delay in the Overby proceedings.  Smith‘s duty 
to advise Judge Means of these facts required no advocacy on 
her part.‖  Id. 
We then raised three additional points to bolster our 
conclusion.  First, because of the continuance in Overby, 
―Smith‘s failure to act occurred during [a] period of judicial 
inactivity‖—a fact that ―cast[] serious doubt on Smith‘s 
claims that her actions [were] ‗intimately associated with the 
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judicial phase‘ of the litigation.‖  Id. at 213–14 (quoting 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).  Second, in 
light of Judge Means‘ alleged orders that Smith inform him of 
changes in Overby‘s status, the court stated:  ―We can 
imagine few circumstances under which we would consider 
the act of disobeying a court order or directive to be 
advocative, and we are loath to grant a prosecutor absolute 
immunity for such disobedience.‖  Id. at 214.  Finally, we 
pointed out that the custom and practice of the Philadelphia 
courts was to assign sole responsibility for monitoring 
material witnesses to the District Attorney‘s Office and to 
individual prosecutors, and that the gist of this obligation 
(consistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(h)) is ―plainly 
administrative.‖  Id.  All this together convinced us that the 
duty Smith failed to fulfill was an administrative one, lacking 
any significant discretionary or advocative component.  
Accordingly, we ruled that absolute immunity was 
inapplicable.  Id. 
B 
We now turn to Smith‘s arguments for setting our prior 
decision aside.  First, she proffers ―new evidence‖ in the form 
of the transcript of Schneyder‘s bail hearing.  On Smith‘s 
reading, the colloquy between Judge Means, Smith, and 
Schneyder contains no explicit directive that Smith advise the 
court in the event of a continuance.  Smith claims that in the 
absence of a clear order, her decision regarding what to tell 
the court was discretionary and thus not administrative.   
Even were we to accept Smith‘s interpretation of the 
evidence (contrary to the rules governing adjudication of her 
own motion for summary judgment), her argument is 
mistaken in its dependence on the Odd panel‘s references to 
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the alleged order as the source of an administrative duty.  
While the order was a relevant and supporting consideration, 
it was not determinative of the court‘s conclusion.  As 
explained above, see supra note 18, the duty being enforced 
in this lawsuit arises from the Constitution, not from the 
authority of a state judge‘s order.  Thus we must ask whether 
Smith‘s violation of that constitutional obligation constituted 
an administrative act or an advocative one.  Whether or not 
the judge issued an order therefore does not control the case, 
and Smith‘s new evidence is unavailing. 
C 
 The next question is whether the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein abrogates the legal 
conclusion we reached in Odd.  Goldstein had been convicted 
and imprisoned after the prosecution failed to provide defense 
counsel with important information which could have been 
used to impeach an informant-witness.  After the evidence 
came to light, Goldstein sued under § 1983, arguing that the 
failure to disclose violated his constitutional rights.  Because 
the two defendants in Van de Kamp occupied managerial and 
oversight roles and were not individually responsible for 
withholding the information, Goldstein advanced theories of 
failure to adequately train and supervise the prosecutors who 
worked under them, and of failure to maintain an information 
system about informants.  See 129 S. Ct. at 859. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the defendants 
were entitled to absolute immunity.  After setting out the 
basic functional approach outlined above, the Court reasoned 
that while the supervisory, training, and management 
functions in question were properly characterized as 
administrative, the obligations they created were ―directly 
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connected with the conduct of a trial.‖  Id. at 862.  Writing for 
a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer first observed that a low-
level prosecutor would be immune from suit for the 
underlying failure to disclose.  Id.  It followed that 
supervisory prosecutors would also be immune from a direct 
attack on their actions relating to a particular trial (i.e., their 
own failure to find and turn over the evidence in question), 
because such actions would also be closely associated with 
the judicial process.  Id.  From there the Court argued that 
there is no way to draw a clean line between supervision and 
training related to a particular case and an office‘s more 
general policies and practices.  Id. at 862–63.  Although the 
development and implementation of such general policies are 
administrative in nature, the practices in question 
―concern[ed] how and when to make impeachment 
information available at a trial.  They are thereby directly 
connected with the prosecutor‘s basic trial advocacy duties.‖  
Id. at 863.  Allowing the suit to go forward would open up 
prosecutors‘ offices to suit in virtually every case in which a 
line prosecutor makes a mistake for which he is personally 
immune.  This would have been both anomalous and contrary 
to the purposes of the absolute immunity doctrine.  See id.
22
   
 Smith argues, and we agree, that Van de Kamp 
establishes subcategories within the ―administrative‖ class of 
                                              
22
 As regards the failure to maintain an adequate 
information system, the Court reasoned that allowing the claim to 
go forward would force courts to inquire not only into whether to 
maintain such a system, but also into the system‘s operation and 
contents.  This, in the Court‘s view, would require review of 
prosecutors‘ exercise of legal judgment—exactly the kind of thing 
prosecutorial immunity is meant to prevent.  See Van de Kamp, 
129 S. Ct. at 864. 
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official functions.  That is, some administrative functions 
relate directly to the conduct of a criminal trial and are thus 
protected, while others (―concerning, for example, workplace 
hiring, payroll administration, the maintenance of physical 
facilities, and the like,‖ id. at 862) are connected to trial only 
distantly (if at all) and are therefore not subject to immunity.  
The question is whether Van de Kamp alters the result in Odd. 
 One thing that Van de Kamp does not change is our 
characterization of the conduct in question as the 
nonperformance of a constitutional duty to advise the court of 
a significant change in the circumstances surrounding the 
detention of a material witness.  We also continue to think 
that this duty is, broadly speaking, administrative rather than 
advocative.  After Van de Kamp, we must ask the further 
question whether this is the sort of administrative duty the 
performance or nonperformance of which is protected by 
prosecutorial immunity.  We hold that it is not. 
 As we stated in Odd, there was no advocative or 
discretionary dimension to Smith‘s dereliction of her duty.  
She was the only person with knowledge of the relevant facts, 
and she was obligated to ensure that the court had information 
sufficient to monitor Schneyder‘s status.  Smith was not 
obligated to argue for Schneyder‘s release; she was required 
only to do what was necessary to allow the court to perform 
its oversight function.  It is true that this was not a 
paradigmatic, ―workplace hiring‖ type of administrative duty, 
but neither was it directly connected to the conduct of a trial.  
After the continuance, the Overby case was a long way off, 
and it simply is not the prosecutor‘s prerogative to decide 
how long to keep a material witness detained.  Declining to 
reveal the change in Overby‘s status was an abdication of 
Smith‘s responsibility to provide the court with information 
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sufficient for it to decide an issue within its sole competence.  
As the sole government official in possession of the relevant 
information, Smith had a duty of disclosure that was neither 
discretionary nor advocative, but was instead a purely 
administrative act not entitled to the shield of immunity, even 
after Van de Kamp.  
V 
On the record before us, we conclude that Smith is not 
entitled to either qualified or absolute immunity.  Her motion 
for summary judgment therefore fails, and we will affirm the 
District Court‘s order. 
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Schneyder v. Smith, No. 10-2367 
 
McKee, Chief Judge, concurring. 
 
I agree wholeheartedly with the majority’s opinion and 
therefore join my colleague’s analysis in its entirety.  I write 
separately merely to suggest that the issue before us is not as 
complex as the majority's very methodical analysis may 
imply.  Although the rather complex subtlety and nuance of 
the majority opinion is extraordinarily useful in resolving this 
issue, it should not give rise to an argument that a reasonable 
prosecutor could not have anticipated today’s result.    
 
The central inquiry before us is simple: would a 
reasonable prosecutor have known that detaining a material 
witness for 48 days after a trial has been continued may have 
been contrary to the wishes of the authorizing court, and that 
this additional detention violated the witness’ constitutional 
rights?  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))  
It takes neither a panel of federal judges nor a prescient 
prosecutor to know that the answer to both questions is a 
resounding “yes.”   
I. 
There are very important reasons to afford prosecutors 
immunity from law suits. As the Supreme Court has 
explained, immunity allows a prosecutor to focus his/her 
energy and attention on the trial at hand as opposed to having 
to worry about being forced to “answer in court each time [] a 
person charged him[/her] with wrongdoing.”  Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976).  It is just as clear that 
there are also very important policies that counsel against 
allowing prosecutors to act with impunity by taking it upon 
themselves to determine when, and if, someone who has been 
properly incarcerated should be released.  This is especially 
true when additional detention may well be contrary to the 
instructions of the judge who authorized the initial seizure 
and detention, and when the circumstances suggest that the 
judge would no longer allow the person to be incarcerated.   
 
The Supreme Court has cautioned that, “[t]he public 
trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were 
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constrained in making every decision by the consequences in 
terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages." Id. 
at 425-26.  However, it is no less certain that public trust of 
that office as well as of the Constitution that the office is 
sworn to uphold would suffer if prosecutors were allowed to 
take it upon themselves to decide when and if someone 
should be released from incarceration.     
 
Here, Smith clearly took it upon herself to decide 
when and if Schneyder would be released.
1
  After 
Schneyder’s family repeatedly called Smith asking when 
Schneyder could leave state custody, Smith informed them, 
“I’m not going to let her go until this matter is resolved.”  
(App. 257) (emphasis added).  The umbrella of immunity 
surely was not intended to shelter such conduct. The power to 
release Schneyder did not reside in Smith nor in any other 
prosecutor.  It resided in the court, and it continued to reside 
there after the Overby trial was postponed.  Smith may well 
have been troubled by the prospect of releasing Schneyder 
and risking an acquittal of Overby, but that was not her 
decision to make.  It is certainly not a novel precept of Anglo 
American jurisprudence to suggest that once the Overby trial 
was continued, Smith should have made any concerns about 
Schneyder's availability known to Judge Means so that the 
court could then decide whether it was still reasonable to 
detain Schneyder under the Fourth Amendment.
2
  
                                              
1
 Since we are reviewing a motion to dismiss, we must accept 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.  See Giuffre v. 
Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994).  
2
 Nor am I concerned that Smith could not have foreseen a 
Fourth Amendment violation because additional detention 
appeared to be a due process issue.   See Bell v Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 535 (1979), and Maj. Op. at 13.  Regardless of the 
label, the foundation of the required analysis is surely the 
same under § 1983.  Any reasonable prosecutor should have 
known the limits of the prosecutorial function and the 
difference between the role of the prosecutor and the role of 
the judge. And any reasonable prosecutor should have known 
that the Constitution is always implicated when a person is 
deprived of his/her liberty by a state sponsored seizure and 
subsequent detention.  
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II. 
 
Smith should have realized that holding Schneyder 
even after the Oberby trial was postponed was contrary to the 
authority Judge Means had afforded her.  At the bail hearing, 
Judge Means clearly stated on the record that he was uneasy 
with incarcerating a person who was not accused of any crime 
in order to obtain her testimony at a subsequent trial.  He 
stated, “I don’t like setting bail on people who are not 
accused of a crime.”  (App. 55 - 56).  He also stated, “if the 
case breaks down, let me know early and I’ll let you out, Ms. 
Schneyder.”3  (App. 55-56).   
 
Judge Means had every reason to believe that 
Schneyder would only be held in custody for a few weeks 
because Smith told the court that the trial would begin “six 
days from today” and that it would be a “ten-day trial at 
most.”  (App. 55-56).  Indeed, it is difficult to read this 
transcript and conclude anything other than that the judge 
believed that he was only authorizing Schneyder's detention 
for a couple of weeks - the time it would take to start and 
finish the Overby trial.  
 
Smith’s actions were also an unreasonable usurpation 
of the judicial authority to detain a material witness in light of 
the prevailing custom in the prosecutor's office.  Judge Means 
testified that the “practice and custom in the Court of 
                                              
3
 In her brief, Smith contends that this statement suggests that 
the judge placed the onus on Schneyder to notify him about 
delays in the case.  The argument is disingenuous. Judge 
Means stated in his subsequent affidavit that he “explicitly 
placed the onus on Ms. Smith to notify [him] if for any reason 
the Overby case was continued or broke down.”  (App. 215).  
Moreover, to the extent that the Commonwealth argues that 
the judge intended for Schneyder to contact him, this is an 
issue of fact that must be resolved against the Commonwealth 
at this stage of the proceedings.  See Deary v. Three Un-
Named Officers, 746 F.2d 185 (3rd Cir. 1984).  
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Common Pleas in these situations [involving material witness 
detentions] is for the prosecutor to bring the matter back to 
court to address any outstanding issues.”  (App. 215).   That 
custom is also evidenced by testimony from Edward McCann, 
then-Chief of the District Attorney’s Homicide Unit and 
Smith’s own supervisor.  He stated that “it’s a well-known 
office policy and Homicide Unit policy” that Smith would 
have a responsibility to notify him if a case had been 
continued and a material witness was held in custody.  (App. 
84).  The policy existed since McCann “came into the DA’s 
office [in 1989].”  (App. 84, 90).  Thus, a reasonable 
prosecutor should have realized that she could not take it 
upon herself to decide when a detained witness would be 
released from custody.
4
 
 
I do not, of course, suggest that the policy of a 
prosecutor's office can give rise to a right of constitutional 
import under § 1983.   However, there was nothing 
unreasonable or novel about Judge Means’ request to be told 
of any continuance in the Overby trial because  Means was 
only authorizing Schneyder's detention for the brief period he 
had been told was necessary to obtain Schneyder’s testimony 
there. 
III. 
                                              
4
 As the majority notes, we previously rejected Smith's claim 
of absolute immunity.  In Odd v. Malone¸538 F.3d 202, 206 
(2008), we considered Smith's appeal along with a similar 
appeal involving an A.D.A. who refused to inform the 
authorizing court that the proceeding in which a material 
witness was to testify had been continued. We noted that the 
judge in the companion case was "[f]urious," upon learning 
she had not been informed, and the judge released the witness 
and "demanded that [the A.D.A.] appear before her to explain 
why the plaintiff had been forced to remain in jail."    
 
     Judge Means' reaction here was similar.  Judge Means and 
his staff were "shocked" and "astonished"  when they learned 
that Schneyder was still incarcerated, and the judge 
repeatedly apologized to Schneyder.   He told her:  "again I 
apologize from the bottom of my heart for what happened to 
you." (App. 7). 
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Nothing we say here suggests that a judge in this 
situation would not have the authority to authorize continued 
incarceration of a material witness if the trial s/he is to testify 
at is postponed.  Had Judge Means been properly informed of 
the continuance, he could have again considered the 
circumstances and competing interests (including Schneyder's 
liberty interest) and could have concluded - based upon all the 
circumstances - that Schneyder's continued incarceration was 
both justified and appropriate.   
 
However, that is not the point.  The fact that 
Schneyder may have remained in custody even if Smith had 
told the court of the continuance does not mean that Smith is 
somehow entitled to immunity.  Rather, the point of our 
holding today is quite simply that any reasonable prosecutor 
should know that the authority to incarcerate belongs to the 
court, not the prosecutor,
5
  and that one who disregards that 
basic tenet violates a clearly established constitutional right.    
I think it is helpful to look beneath the intricacies and 
algebraic equations that assist my colleagues’ analysis, 
because our holding results in nothing more surprising than 
that extraordinarily unremarkable conclusion.  Neither our 
holding today, nor the reactions of the judges whom I 
reference in footnote4 should come as a surprise to anyone 
with even a rudimentary familiarity with the restrictions 
imposed on the power of the state by the Fourth Amendment, 
or the distinction between the prosecutorial function and 
judicial authority. 
 
 
                                              
5
 See Odd,  258 F.3d at 214   ("In short, it is a judicial 
function - the function of the courts - not a prosecutorial 
function, to determine whom to incarcerate and for what 
length of time.").  
 
